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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FDA, EPA, AND OSHA INSPECTIONS - PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN LIGHT OF Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth in size and power of administrative agencies has brought
increasing intrusions into the conduct of individual affairs. This phenomenon
has recently provoked much discussion of how best to limit the discretionary
powers of administrative agencies.' At the same time, the tremendous potential
dangers of industrial technology have created a need for administrative
regulation of many aspects of society that cannot be effectively controlled
through individual action.
This classic dilemma - how to preserve individual rights while allowing
government to pursue approved social goals - has been particularly trouble-
some in the context of administrative inspections of private industry. In
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,2 the most recent of a series of Supreme Court
decisions dealing with administrative inspections,3 the Court held that warrant-
1. Several bills presently before Congress indicate the strength of the anti-
regulation sentiment. Perhaps the most widely publicized of these is an amendment to the
Federal Trade Commission Act, Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21, 94 Stat. 393 (1980), which provides for a legislative veto of any
rule adopted by the Federal Trade Commission. This amendment is significant in both its
immediate and long-term effects. The immediate effect is complete Congressional control
over the Federal Trade Commission's activities, which have lately been considered far too
broad-sweeping. The long-term effect would be to encourage the same type of control over
other regulatory agencies.
Two other bills propose to alleviate the overwhelming burden of federal
regulation on small businesses. The Smaller Enterprise Regulatory Improvement Act,
H.R. 4660, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H5420 (1979), proposes that all federal
agencies be required to publish analyses of the effects of each new regulatory proposal on
small business. Small businesses would have to be exempted from all regulations if it is
found to be "lawful, desirable and feasible" to do so. Less burdensome versions of agency
regulations for small businesses would have to be developed where exemption is not
possible. In addition, H.R. 4660 requires the same process of analysis to be applied to all
existing regulations. The Senate version of this proposal, S. 1860, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. S14065 (1979), is very similar in scope and purpose.
Finally, a proposed amendment to the Federal Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 8854 (1979), requires each federal agency to prepare
a description of the economic and social effects of any proposed rule. Investigation of less
costly or less intrusive alternatives is required and Congress is given the power to review
reports of these activities through the Congressional Budget Office.
2. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
3. See text accompanying notes 15 to 32 infra for a discussion of the relevant
Supreme Court decisions which preceded Barlow's.
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less, nonconsensual searches by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) violated the fourth amendment,4 thereby striking a balance
between the rights of the individual and the administrative powers of
government. The Court also held, however, that the fourth amendment could be
satisfied if the agency obtained an administrative warrant prior to the search.5
An administrative warrant is a hybrid. As described by the Supreme Court in
Barlow's, the issuance of such a warrant requires a showing of probable cause
before a neutral magistrate, 6 but the standard of probable cause is less stringent
than that required for a criminal warrant.7
As a result of this description of administrative warrants, and the
concomitant holding of the Court, the decision in Barlow's presents many
questions. First, one can question the Court's constitutional basis for finding
administrative searches subject to any fourth amendment restrictions.' Even if
such searches are within the restrictions of the fourth amendment, however, it
may be difficult to justify the notion that the probable cause required for a
warrant differs according to whether the warrant sought is administrative or
criminal. Furthermore, as with all compromises, there is a serious question as
4. 436 U.S. at 325. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See text accompanying notes 33 to 39 infra.
5. 436 U.S. at 323.
6. Id.
7. See notes 108 to 200 and accompanying text infra. The standard of administrative
probable cause espoused by the Supreme Court in Barlow's is defended under several
different theories. The first and most persuasive theory is that by relaxing the standard of
probable cause required for administrative warrants, the Supreme Court attempted a
compromise between the powerful competing interests of individuals and the government.
The decision is viewed as an attempt to maintain the maximum effectiveness of
administrative programs without totally sacrificing fourth amendment rights. See
Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J. 63, 66-67.
The second explanation suggests that the high probability of uncovering regulatory
violations during any administrative search justifies a lower standard of probable cause.
Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment -
Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALB. L. REV. 155, 172 (1967). Third, administrative
probable cause is defended on the ground that criminal probable cause need only be
required for potential criminal prosecutions. The theory is that in cases where only civil or
regulatory penalties are at stake a less stringent standard of probable cause is adequate.
See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See
Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 17-18. Finally, administrative searches are viewed as less
intrusive than criminal searches, and therefore in need of a lower standard of probable
cause. Id. at 19.
8. Justice Stevens' dissent in Barlow's, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist,
did question the majority's constitutional basis for its opinion. The dissent's theory was
that the fourth amendment requires warrants only for unreasonable searches and that an
administrative search was reasonable and therefore outside fourth amendment protection.
436 U.S. at 325-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to whether the interests of either side are really served by the decision of the
Court.9 An administrative warrant may consume time and hinder effective
agency functioning, while simultaneously failing to protect individuals from
the intrusions of routine administrative inspections. One final question
concerns the fact that the Supreme Court did not detail the workings of its
lesser probable cause standard, nor did it describe precisely how administrative
agencies other than OSHA were to implemenent its decisions. Regardless of the
answers to these questions, the effect of the Barlow's decision remains the
same. Warrantless administrative searches, unless subject to one of a few
judicially-recognized exceptions,'0 are constitutionally prohibited."
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision falls most heavily on the
individual businessman who must deal with several federal agencies at one
time. For example, a chemical manufacturer is overseen by at least three
agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),1 2 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)13 and OSHA. 14 This comment will examine those
federal court opinions which have considered the effect of the Barlow's decision
on the activities of these three agencies in order to discover what courses of
9. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Barlow's, expressed the opinion that the OSHA
statutory scheme already provided all the protections that a warrant could possibly
provide, thereby negating the need for the interposition of a neutral magistrate to put his
automatic stamp on each inspection. 436 U.S. at 332-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. See notes 44 to 107 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the exceptions to
the Barlow's decision.
11. 436 U.S. at 321.
12. The FDA, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976),
administers several statutory sections which have a potential impact on chemical
manufacturers. Chemicals which are manufactured for use as food additives are regulated
under 21 U.S.C. § 348, while chemicals used in the production of drugs and medical
devices are regulated under 21 U.S.C. 99 351-360k. The ingredients and conditions of
manufacture of cosmetics are regulated under 21 U.S.C. 99 361-363.
13. The EPA administers several statutes which may affect chemical manufacturers.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976),
governs the manufacture, sale, and distribution of pesticides. The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976), governs the disposal and treatment of
hazardous wastes, which include many of the by-products of the chemical industry. The
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 99 2601-2629 (1976), regulates the manufacture
of chemical substances which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the
environment, and which are not already covered under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
or the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Almost every product of the
chemical industry is therefore covered by some form of federal regulation.
In addition, the emissions of the clemical plant itself are subject to federal
pollution control standards which are administered by the EPA. These include the Clean
Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), and the Clean Air Act
of 1977, 42 U.S.C. 99 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978).
14. A business is regulated by OSHA, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. 99 651-678 (1976), if it affects interstate commerce. Id. § 651(b)(3). Almost all
chemical manufacturers who sell and distribute their products beyond a limited local area
would fit into this category.
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action are available to an individual faced with a warrantless administrative
inspection or an administrative search warrant.
II. THE MARSHALL V. BARLOW'S, INC. DECISION AND ITS BACKGROUND
1 5
The Supreme Court first articulated the notion of an administrative
warrant with a lowered standard of probable cause in 1967, in the companion
cases of Camara v. Municipal Court16 and See v. City of Seattle.17 In Camara, the
lessee of an apartment refused to consent to a warrantless routine inspection by
a housing inspector. The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches did apply to such administrative
inspections,"8 and that except in certain situations, such as an emergency,19 the
lessee could not be prosecuted for refusing a warrantless search. 20 However, the
standard of probable cause required for the issuance of such a warrant was not
15. The Barlow's decision and its background have received extensive treatment in
the legal periodicals, most of which is more detailed than the general discussion presented
here. See generally Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 1979
DUKE L.J. 63; Shipley, Warrantless Administrative Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 81 (1979); Comment, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Requirements, 32 ARK. L. REV. 755 (1979); Note, Administrative
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1979); Comment, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Warrantless
Routine OSHA Inspections a Violation of the Fourth Amendment?, 6 ENVT'L AFF. 423
(1978); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: Administrative Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 9 ENVT'L L. 149 (1978); Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Administra-
tive Inspections, 16 Hous. L. REV. 399 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. and the
Warrant Requirement for OSHA "Spot Check" Inspections, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 187 (1978);
Note, A Modern Approach to the Fourth Amendment: The Reconciliation of Individual
Rights with Governmental Interests, 39 LA. L. REV. 623 (1979); Comment, Searches by
Administrative Agencies After Barlow's and Tyler: Fourth Amendment Pitfalls and
Short-Cuts, 14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 207 (1979); Note, Rationalizing Administrative
Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1979); Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the
Administrative Search - The Probable lause Requirement After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
5 N. Ky. L. REV. 219 (1978); Comment, Administrative Roulette: Safety Inspection Probable
Cause in Light of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 23 ST. Louis U. L.J. 768 (1979); Comment,
Maryland's Warrantless Inspection Laws: A Warrantless Expectation of Constitutionality, 8
U. BALT. L. REV. 88 (1978); Comment, Administrative Law: Administrative Inspection
Procedure, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 325 (1979); Comment, The Warrant Requirement for OSHA
Inspections: The Supreme Court Establishes a Two-Tiered Test for Probable Cause, 15
WILLIAMETTE L.J. 61 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Propriety
of Warrantless Searches by OSHA Inspectors - Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978), 1979 Wis. L. REV. 815; 9 CUM. L. REV. 287 (1978); 57 N.C. L. REV. 320 (1979); 55
N.D. L. REV. 95 (1979); 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 119 (1978); 46 TENN. L. REV. 446 (1979); 50
U. COLO. L. REV. 231 (1979); 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 652 (1979); 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 991
(1978).
16. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
18. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
19. Id. at 539. See notes 59 to 61 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
emergency exception.
20. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967).
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to be based on a belief that a code violation existed in any particular dwelling;
rather it was to be founded on "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection."'" This standard was developed by
balancing the governmental interest which justified the intrusion against the
constitutional rights of the individual.22
In the See case, the owner of a commercial warehouse refused to allow fire
department officials to conduct a warrantless routine inspection of the building.
The Supreme Court extended the holding of the Camara opinion to include
private commercial premises, saying that "administrative entry, without
consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the
public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the
framework of a warrant procedure." 23
Two later cases provided the major exception to the Camara-See principle.24
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,21 the Supreme Court upheld the
federal regulatory scheme which gave authority to Internal Revenue Service
agents to force entry into the premises of liquor dealers and make warrantless
seizures of liquor.2" The Court found no fourth amendment violation in the
statute because of the liquor industry's long history of regulation; thus, close
supervision and inspection was reasonable even without a warrant.27 The
Colonnade exception was carried further in United States v. Biswell,2 where the
Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless seizure of unlicensed
firearms from a retailer's locked storeroom violated the fourth amendment.The
federal agents who seized the guns had done so under the authority of the Gun
Control Act of 196829 which authorized warrantless searches and seizures of
firearms.30 Although the Supreme Court recognized that federal regulation of
firearms did not have the long historical roots attributed to regulation of the
liquor industry in Colonnade,31 it nevertheless found adequate cause to exempt
the Gun Control Act from the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment.
The Court found justification in the pervasive regulation of the firearms
industry, in the fact that the dealer had chosen to accept a federal license with
21. Id. at 538.
22. Id. at 535.
23. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
24. See text accompanying notes 68 to 107 infra for a discussion of the application of
this exception to OSHA, the FDA, and the EPA.
25. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
26. Retail liquor dealers are subject to a special federal tax. 26 U.S.C. § 5121(a)
(1976). As part of this taxing authority, Internal Revenue Service agents are given the
power to inspect the premises of retail liquor dealers. 26 U.S.C. § 7606 (1976). Dealers
who refuse to submit to such an inspection are subject to a penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 7342
(1976).
27. 397 U.S. at 77.
28. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
30. Id. at § 923(g).
31. 397 U.S. at 75.
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knowledge of the inspection provisions, and in the urgent federal interest in
regulating firearms.
3 2
The Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. decision, which dealt with the issue of
OSHA's authority to inspect, defined the limits of the Colonnade-Biswell
exception. 33 Unlike the regulatees in Biswell and Colonnade, the regulatees
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 34 are neither licensed nor subject
to a long history of intensive government regulation. The standards set by
OSHA apply to all "businesses affecting interstate commerce," 35 which covers
the majority of businesses in the United States. Therefore, the Supreme Court
found that the inspectional provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,36 insofar as they permitted warrantless, nonconsensual searches by OSHA
inspectors, were violative of the fourth amendment, 37 just as the fire and
housing inspection ordinances had been in Camara and See.
In spite of this constitutional weakness in the OSHA statutory scheme, the
Court did not strike down the inspection provisions of the statute. Instead, it
permitted the Secretary of Labor to use the authority to inspect conferred by
the statute as a means of promulgating regulations which would satisfy the
fourth amendment. 38 The Secretary of Labor could thus correct the deficiency in
the statute by promulgating regulations which require an administrative
32. 406 U.S. at 316-17.
33. The controversy which led to the Supreme Court's consideration of the Barlow's
case is based on a straightforward set of facts. An OSHA inspector attempted a routine
inspection of an electrical and plumbing installation business in Idaho. The manager of
the business, Ferrol G. Barlow, refused to admit the inspector because he did not have a
search warrant. The Secretary of Labor then obtained a court order compelling the
manager to admit the inspector. Mr. Barlow responded by obtaining an injunction in
federal district court against any future warrantless inspections under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. The Secretary of Labor's appeal from this injunction was then
heard by the Supreme Court. 436 U.S. at 309-10. See also the law review materials cited
in note 15 supra for further discussion of the facts of the Barlow's case.
34. The broad scope of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is reflected in the
enormous number of its regulatees. Approximately five million workplaces and seventy-
one million employees are covered by the Act. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, REPORT No. 586, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN 1978: SUMMARY 2 (1980).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976).
36. OSHA inspections are authorized under 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976) which provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed
by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of
employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer,
owner, operator, agent, or employee.
37. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978).
38. Id. at 325 n.23.
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warrant whenever a regulatee refuses to comply with an OSHA inspection. The
probable cause needed to obtain the administrative warrant would be the one
first announced in Camara:
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an
administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of
"a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing
violation but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an. . . inspection are satisfied with respect to
a particular [establishment].'39
However, the vagueness of this administrative probable cause standard would
prove problematical when applied by the lower courts.'
An area of concern to the Court in Barlow's was the effect of its decision on
warrantless search provisions in other regulatory statutes.41 Accordingly, the
Court noted that warrantless search provisions in these statutes were not
automatically invalid in light of its holding in Barlow's.42 Instead, the
reasonableness, and thus the constitutionality, of other inspection provisions
was said to depend upon "the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees
39. Id. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 528, 538 (1967))
(footnote omitted).
40. See text accompanying notes 109 to 146 infra.
41. At the time of the Barlow's decision, inspection provisions similar or identical to
those of the Occupational Safety and Health Act were contained in the following federal
statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(g) (1976);
the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (1976); the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1270 (1976); the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1976); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2610
(1976); the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 603 (1976); the Egg Product
Inspections Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1034(a), (b) (1976); the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26
U.S.C. § 5146(b), § 7606 (1976); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976);
the Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 723-724 (1976); the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. II 1978); the Clean Water Act
of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. II 1978); the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 38 (1976); the
Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. § 53 (1976); the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2 62(c) (1976); the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 263(i)
(1976); the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2035(c) (1976); the National Mobile Home
Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5413(a), (b), (f) (1976); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (Supp. II 1978); the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-7414 (Supp. II 1978); the Railroad
Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 437 (b) (Supp. II 1978); the Steamboat Inspection Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 362, 408 (1976); id. § 404(s); the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1425(b)
(1976); the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1677(a)(3), 1681(b)
(1976); the Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1808(c) (1976). See Appellant's
Reply Brief at 49 n.25, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
42. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978).
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of each statute. '4' The effect of this statement can only be judged by an analysis
of the responses of other administrative agencies and the challenges which have
been made in the federal courts.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF MARSHALL V. BARLOW'S, INC. AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO FDA, EPA, AND OSHA INSPECTIONS
44
The Barlow's prohibition against warrantless administrative inspections
appears at first to be broad-sweeping in application. In practice, however, most
administrative inspections fall into one of several exceptions to the Barlow's
rule. These exceptions operate on two levels. On one level, individual
inspections may be excepted if the regulatee consents, and on a second level,
entire classes of inspections may be excepted, regardless of consent, due to the
nature of the inspection.
A. Consent to Inspection
The exception for consent to a warrantless search is important because most
regulatees permit inspections to proceed without challenge.45 As the Supreme
Court has consistently noted in Camara,46 See,47 and Barlow's,4s consent to a
warrantless administrative inspection negates any claim to a fourth amendment
right. The definition of administrative consent, as developed by the courts, is
much broader than that of criminal consent. For example, the fact that
statutory penalties exist for refusing certain administrative inspections has
been held not to be a form of coercion which arguably could force a regulatee to
consent.49 Thus, even if the regulatee is aware of the criminal penalties, and
consents on the basis of this knowledge, his consent is considered to be freely
43. Id.
44. See generally note 15 supra and sources cited therein for other discussions of the
exceptions to the Barlow's holding.
45. For example, in the four-month period after Barlow's was decided, OSHA
attempted approximately 11,000 warrantless inspections, and was refused entry in less
than 500 of them. [19781 8 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 564.
46. 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
47. 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
48. 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978).
49. United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
926 (1970) (consent to warrantless inspection by FDA agents).
FDA inspections are authorized under 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1976), which provides
ln part:
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or employees duly designated
by the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice to the
owner, operator, or agent in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times,
any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics
are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for introduction into interstate
commerce or after such introduction, or to enter any vehicle being used to transport or
hold such food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in interstate commerce; and (2) to inspect,
at reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such
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given. 50 In addition, a regulatee's consent is considered valid even if he is
unaware of his right to refuse a warrantless inspection.51 Miranda warnings are
not required before an administrative search, even if potential criminal
penalties may result from any violations found by the inspectors.
52
The concept of administrative consent is made even broader because
consent does not have to be given by the person ultimately responsible for any
violations. Usually, the owner of the business or premises will ,bear this
responsibility, but any person in charge at the time of inspection, such as a
manager or employee, may give a valid consent which will abrogate later
challenges to the inspection on fourth amendment grounds.
5 3
It is important to note, however, that consent to a warrantless administra-
tive inspection is radically different from consent to a search pursuant to a
warrant. In Stephenson Enterprises, Inc. v. Marshall,4 an employer consented to
a warrantless OSHA inspection and later attempted to challenge the inspection
on fourth amendment grounds in the court of appeals. As expected, the court
held that the consent invalidated such a challenge. 55 But in Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Marshall,5 6 an employer consented to an OSHA inspection "under protest
'5 7
after the inspectors exhibited their warrant. Significantly, the court held that
challenges to the validity of a warrant could be considered in spite of the
consent to the search.55 The importance of the consent exception, therefore,
appears to be confined to the case of a warrantless search.
B. The Nature of the Inspection
The consent exception operates on a case-by-case basis. But in three general
classes of situations, the courts have determined that consent is immaterial and
that warrantless administrative searches are permissible. These three situa-
tions are: emergencies, "open field" inspections, and inspections of pervasively
regulated industries (the Colonnade-Biswell exception).
factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all pertinent equipment, finished
and unfinished materials; containers, and labeling therein.
Id. (footnote omitted). The refusal to permit entry for such an inspection is a prohibited act
under 21 U.S.C. § 331(f) (1976). The penalty for a violation of § 331 is a maximum
one-year's imprisonment and/or a fine. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1976).
50. United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006, 1010 n.5 (9th Cir.) cert. denied,
400 U.S. 926 (1970).
51. United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1002 (1970).
52. United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d at 1010 n.6; United States v. New
Eng. Grocer Supply Co., 442 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1977).
53. United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972).
54. 578 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 1024.
56. 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 376-77.
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The exception for emergency situations was recognized long before the
Barlow's decision. 9 An emergency is generally a situation involving immediate
danger to the public health or safety. In such a situation, the need to protect the
public overrides any individual fourth amendment interest, and warrantless
inspections are permitted.6 0 This exception is particularly relevant to the FDA,
which may enter and seize adulterated drugs without a warrant, based on the
need to protect public health. 1 It would be more difficult for the EPA or OSHA
to justify a search under the emergency doctrine, unless perhaps an employee
compla-int could demonstrate such a broad danger that not only the immediate
employees, but other members of the public would be endangered.
The "open field" exception is analogous to the plain view doctrine62 for
criminal searches. Like the emergency exception, it has a long history of judicial
recognition.63 An administrative official may conduct a warrantless inspection
of anything that is open to the public view.6 4 In fact, under the doctrine of Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,65 an administrative inspector
may conduct a warrantless search on privately-owned property, as long as the
public is invited there.66 The open field exception can be most readily applied by
59. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967), where the Supreme
Court noted some of the long-standing examples of emergency inspections and seizures
including: North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (permitting
the warrantless seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (upholding compulsory smallpox vaccinations); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation
a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (upholding a health
quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929) (upholding a
warrantless, summary destruction of tubercular cattle).
60. E.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held, on
the basis of the emergency doctrine, that municipal firefighters could enter a burning
building and collect evidence of arson without a search warrant. In addition, the Court
held that the firefighters could continue their warrantless search to determine the cause of
the fire for a reasonable time after the fire was extinguished. 436 U.S. at 509-11.
61. The FDA is given the power to make seizures and condemnations under 21 U.S.C.
§ 334 (1976), which provides in part that:
(a)(1) Any article of food, drug, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded when
introduced into or while in interstate commerce or while held for sale . . . after
shipment in interstate commerce . . . shall be liable to be proceeded against ... on
libel of information and condemned. . . . (b) The article, equipment, or other thing
proceeded against shall be liable to seizure by process pursuant to the libel....
Id. Under 21 U.S.C. § 372(e) (1976), FDA enforcement personnel are given the power to
seize drugs before the § 334 libel proceedings are begun, if necessary.
62. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, §§ 2.2, 6.7 (1978) for a discussion of the plain view doctrine.
63. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), the Supreme Court stated that
"the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment 'to the people in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the
latter and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
64. W. LAFAvE, supra note 57, § 2.2(a).
65. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
66. Id. at 864-65.
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the EPA, in inspections for air or water pollution, or by OSHA, in inspections
for outdoor construction site hazards. 67
The exception most affected by the Barlow's decision is that of pervasively
regulated industries. The Colonnade and Biswell cases, which are the source of
this exception, do not explicitly define the limits of the category. In Colonnade,
the determining factor which permitted warrantless searches was the long
history of regulation of the liquor industry.68 In Biswell, several characteristics
of the firearms trade were mentioned by the Court in finding that warrantless
searches are permissible, including the pervasive government regulation of the
industry, the licensing of the industry, and the urgent federal interest in
regulation.6
9
With only these general factors as a guide, it has been left to the regulatory
agencies and the lower federal courts to decide whether various regulatory
inspection programs fit into the pervasive regulation exception. The decision is
an important one. If an agency inspection program covers pervasively regulated
industries, warrantless inspection provisions in the agency's statute or regula-
tions are valid. 7' This means that regulatees may be subject to criminal
penalties for refusal to allow warrantless searches,71 or inspectors may forcibly
enter the premises without fear of sanctions. 72 If any agency's statute purports
to authorize warrantless inspections, and the regulated industries do not fit into
the pervasive regulation exception, the entire inspectional statute may be
struck down on fourth amendment grounds.73
Valid warrantless inspections under the pervasive regulation exception
therefore depend on two things: the nature of the industry being inspected and
the agency's statutory authority to make the inspections. A business may have
all the characteristics of a pervasively regulated industry, but an inspection
statute that does not provide for warrantless searches (i.e., criminal penalties
67. See, e.g., Titanium Metals Corp. of Am., 7 Occupational Safety and Health Cases
2172 (Jan. 24, 1980).
68. 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). See notes 24 to 27 and accompanying text supra.
69. 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972). See also text accompanying notes 28 to 32 supra.
70. See note 41 supra for a list of federal statutes containing warrantless inspection
provisions. The number of inspection programs which are potentially affected by the
Barlow's decision underscores the importance of the pervasive regulation exception as a
means of validating the statutes.
71. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1976), which makes the refusal to permit an inspection
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act a crime.
72. This was exactly the result in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 73 (1970).
73. The invalidation of an entire inspectional statute seems unlikely in view of the
treatment given the OSHA statute in Barlow's. See note 69 supra. However, other
administrative agencies would be extremely reluctant to expend the effort needed to
amend their inspection statutes in order to bring them in line with the Barlow's opinion,
unless the ultimate threat of invalidation was present. The Supreme Court's threat of
invalidation, then, remains in order to ensure agency compliance with the-requirements of
the Barlow's opinion.
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for refusal or provisions for forcible entry) will prevent an agency from utilizing
the full powers of the exception. Similarly, a business that is not subject to the
pervasive regulation exception cannot be made statutorily subject to warrant-
less inspections, 7 no matter how broad the agency's statutory authority may be.
The Barlow's decision discussed both aspects of the problem. The Court
found that industries regulated by OSHA did not have the characteristics of
pervasively regulated industries, and the agency was instructed to amend its
overbroad inspectional statute by promulgating appropriate regulations.75
Although the Court did not discuss all of the elements which place OSHA
outside of the exception, some conclusions can be drawn which allow the
Barlow's decision to be applied to the FDA and the EPA.
The most outstanding characteristic of OSHA regulation is its broad
application. OSHA has the power to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards for all "businesses affecting interstate commerce."76 This broad
power means that OSHA regulatees cannot be classified into any one category.
The diversity of the types of businesses regulated by OSHA prevents any
generalizations as to history of government regulation or urgency of federal
interest. OSHA does not license its regulatees; on the contrary, its impact on
any one industry may range from a very minimal supervision to a comprehen-
sive, intensively pursued plan of regulation. Perhaps the most controversial
aspect of OSHA regulation is its application to both large businesses and
small.
77
Both members of the FDA, 8 and legal representatives of private industry,79
have applied the pervasively regulated industry analysis to the FDA, and have
74. Unless, of course, the inspection fits into one of the other exceptions: consent,
emergency, or open fields. See text accompanying notes 45 to 67 supra.
It is important to distinguish these three exceptions from pervasively regulated
industries. Under consent, emergency, or open fields, an agency may make valid
warrantless inspections in an individual case although the agency statute does not provide
for warrantless searches as a general rule. Thus the crucial distinction of these three
exceptions is that it allows the agencies to go beyond the limits of statutory authority to
inspect in specific instances. The pervasive regulation exception actually allows the
statutory authority to be broadened.
75. 436 U.S. at 317 n.12. Presumably, other agencies could likewise correct
constitutional deficiencies in their inspection statutes by issuing amendatory regulations.
This solution obviates rewriting the inspection statute itself.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976).
77. See Levin, Politics and Polarity - The Limits of OSHA Reform, Reg., Nov./Dec.
1979, at 33.
A strong dmotional current of belief in the United States holds the small
businessman to be the cornerstone of capitalism. His right to be free from governmental
intrusion is held to be above that of giant corporations. Existing along with this sentiment
is the fact that many businesses made subject to OSHA inspection had never been
inspected by government officials. Thus, the impact of OSHA regulation was felt with a
greater intensity than it perhaps otherwise would have been.
78. Basile, The Case Law on Inspections, 34 Foon DRUG CosM. L.J. 20, 23-24 (1979).
79. Allera, Warrantless Inspections of the Food Industry, 34 Food DRUG CosM. L.J.
260, 270 (1979). See also Norton, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Inspections by the
Food and Drug Administration, 35 Fooo DRuG Cosm. L.J. 25 (1980).
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agreed that warrantless FDA searches do come within the pervasive regulation
exception. The statutory authority for warrantless inspections is present,8 ° and
the industries regulated by the FDA, including manufacturers of food,"' drugs,"
medical devices,8 3 and cosmetics,8 4 are ones which historically have been the
object of much government regulation. 5 There is an urgent federal interest in
protecting the public health through regulation of these industries, because it is
the ultimate consumer who must be protected, not those engaged in the industry
itself. The federal interest is greater here than with OSHA regulation, because
the employees sought to be protected by OSHA can detect many of the dangers
themselves, thereby avoiding them. Since the consumers of foods, drugs, and
cosmetics have no control over the manufacture of these products, and are often
unaware of the dangers, they cannot avoid the problems without governmental
intervention. In addition, the argument has also been made that, much like the
licensed firearm dealer in Biswell, those individuals who choose to enter into a
heavily regulated business such as the manufacture of prescription drugs, do so
with full knowledge of the nature of the FDA's broad regulatory powers in this
area, and thus impliedly consent to FDA's inspection authority.8 6 The problem
with this argument is that the FDA cannot justify a constitutionally invalid
inspection program by simply saying that anyone who chooses to be regulated
by the FDA, chooses to accept unconstitutional regulation as well.
In spite of the above considerations, warrantless FDA inspections must fit
within the limits of the pervasive regulation exception as developed in Barlow's
in order to survive, and it appears, upon closer analysis, that FDA inspections
do not fit neatly into this exception. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act covers a
diverse group of industries and manufacturers. Although the diversity of its
coverage is not as great as that of OSHA, the FDA is still given inspection
authority over a broad range of industries. In both Colonnade and Biswell, the
pervasive regulation exception was applied to single, easily identifiable
industries (liquor and firearms). The FDA's coverage is much broader than a
single industry, but it is well-defined. Manufacturers of drugs are much easier
80. The FDA inspectional statutes do not require a warrant. Criminal penalties are
imposed for refusal to permit an inspection. See note 49 supra.
81. The food industry is regulated under 21 U.S.C. §§ 341-348 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
82. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
83. 21 U.S.C. H 360c-360k (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
84. 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
85. Government regulation of the food, drug, and cosmetic industry can be traced well
back into the nineteenth century. Early federal legislation aimed at this industry
included: an 1848 law providing for the examination of all drugs, medicines and medicine
preparations imported into the United States in order to ensure their purity and fitness;
the Filled Cheese Act of 1896; the Tea Act of 1897; the Virus, Serum, Toxin and Antitoxin
Act of July 1, 1902; the Meat Inspection Act of 1907; the Horse Meat Act of 1919; the
Imported Meat Act of 1913; the Act to Define Butter (1923); the Filled Milk Act of 1923;
the Federal Caustic Poison Act of 1927; the Insecticide Act of 1910; and the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906. H. TOULMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FOOD, DRUGS AND
COSMETICS H 1-2 (1942).
86. Basile, supra note 78, at 27.
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to identify as a class than "businesses affecting interstate commerce."87 In
breadth of coverage, at least, the FDA sits on the borderline of the pervasive
regulation exception, which perhaps will lead to some difficulty in any court
challenge to the FDA's inspectional authority.
Another problem with permitting warrantless, nonconsensual FDA inspec-
tions under the Barlow's rule is that some lower courts before Barlow's had held
such FDA searches to be invalid,"s even though the statute permitted them.
Since the Supreme Court did not specifically mention the FDA anywhere in the
Barlow's opinion, it is not clear that the Court intended to broaden the FDA's
inspectional authority beyond the bounds of previous judicial limitations. One
can only assume, however, that if the FDA fits into the pervasive regulation
exception, the Barlow's decision permits the agency to make warrantless,
nonconsensual searches. In view of the history of regulation of the food and drug
industry, and the urgent federal interest in pursuing such regulation, it seems
that the FDA does fit into the exception.
8 9
The EPA's regulatory powers extend to a broad, heterogeneous group of
industries. At first glance this appears to distinguish the EPA from the FDA,
making warrantless, nonconsensual EPA searches more like those inspections
made under the OSHA statute, and thus impermissible under the fourth
amendment. 90 This conclusion, however, fails to account for the varied sources
of EPA inspectional authority. The EPA is given inspection authority under
seven different statutes. 91 The industries regulated by each of these statutes,
and the statutes themselves, must be analyzed separately in order to determine
their status under the pervasive regulation exception.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976).
88. United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert., denied
396 U.S. 1002 (1969); United States v. J.B. Kramer Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Stanack Sales Co., 387 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kendall
Co., 324 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1971).
89. See United States v. New Eng. Grocers Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 237-39 (D. Mass.
1980).
90. Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 123, 130-32
(1979).
91. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136g (1976);
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976); the Clean Water Act of 1977,
33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. II 1978); the Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300k
(1976 & Supp. II 1978); the Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §4912 (1976); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (Supp. II 1978); and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-7414 (Supp. II 1978).
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Four of the statutes administered by the EPA - the Clean Air Act,92 the
Clean Water Act, 93 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,9 4 and the
Noise Control Act9" - share one determinative characteristic; they provide for
the regulation of abroad, heterogeneous class of industries. These statutes are
very much like the Occupational Safety and Health Act, in that the regulatees
under these statutes cannot be uniformly characterized as pervasively reg-
ulated. Because the types of industries are diverse, there is no identifiable
history of intensive government regulation for all the regulatees. Nor is there
an urgent federal interest which would justify warrantless inspections of such a
broad segment of this country's businesses. The preservation of environmental
quality is certainly a worthy federal goal, but the potential danger from any
individual violation of these statutes may not be direct enough to warrant the
abrogation of a constitutional right. The federal interest behind the FDA, by
comparison, is to protect against the direct danger of death from the
consumption of contaminated or unsafe food and drugs. A slight decrease in
environmental quality cannot compare to such an urgency of interest, especially
when one considers the other avenues of inspection open to the agency, such as
warrant-authorized inspections.
Because the industries regulated under these four statutes do not have any
of the characteristics of industries covered by the pervasively regulated industry
exception, warrantless, nonconsensual inspections under these statutes would
be constitutionally impermissible. Even if the nature of the regulatees did not
preclude warrantless searches the statutes themselves would, because none of
these statutes authorizes warrantless searches. The Noise Control Act, through
92. The broad coverage of the Clean Air Act is illustrated, for example, in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411 (Supp. II 1978), which gives the EPA the power to set standards of performance for
"any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant" that is constructed or modified after the promulgation of the EPA standards. 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
93. The broad goal of the Clean Water Act is the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1 (1976), and
prohibition of the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)
(1976). In order to meet these goals, that Act makes the discharge of any pollutants by any
person (subject to statutory exceptions) a violation of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
94. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act gives the EPA the power to
promulgate regulations which will establish standards for generators of hazardous wastes.
42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1976 & Supp. 111978). The term "hazardous waste" is given a very broad
definition under the Act, and includes:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may - (A) cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id. at § 6903 (1976).
95. The Noise Control Act gives the EPA administrator the power to set regulations
for any product distributed in interstate commerce for which the administrator finds that
"1noise emission standards are feasible and are requisite to protect the pubic health and
welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 4905(b) (1976).
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new regulations designed to conform to the Barlow's decision, 96 specifically
provides that inspectors must obtain a warrant for nonconsensual inspections.
The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act all provide that the EPA must obtain judicial process if an
inspection is refused.9 7 This means that before a nonconsensual inspection may
proceed, the EPA must seek either a civil penalty, as provided for in each of the
acts, or a warrant. Forcible entry or criminal penalties are not authorized by
Ohese acts.
The three remaining statutes which are administered by the EPA - the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,9s the Toxic Substances
Control Act,99 and the Safe Water Drinking Act,100 - all share characteristics
which make them much like the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. These statutes
are aimed at three well-defined types of industries: pesticide manufacturers and
distributors, manufacturers and distributors of chemicals which pose an
imminent hazard to the public health or the environment (as determined by the
EPA), and public water systems. These industries possess a degree of
homogeneity which distinguishes them from the broad class of OSHA reg-
ulatees. Although there may be some diversity within each of the three classes,
the basic nature of the business remains clearly identifiable in each case.
Furthermore, there is an urgent federal interest in regulating each of these
industries because there is a direct and specific danger to the health of members
of the public if federal regulations are not enforced. Improper purification of
drinking water, for example, can result in serious illness or death to consumers.
Improper storage or distribution of pesticides or deadly chemicals can lead to
severe public health dangers. The pervasive regulation of these industries does
not have the historical roots, perhaps, that are found in the regulation of foods
and drugs, but this is due in part to the newness of many of the chemicals
96. 40 C.F.R. §205.4(e)(1) (1979) provides that: "lilt is not a violation of this
regulation or the Act for any person to refuse entry without a warrant." See also Chrysler
Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 904, 906 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
97. The Clean Air Act provides that anyone refusing an inspection under the Act is
subject to a compliance order or a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1978). The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act makes a similar provision for refusal to permit
an inspection. The EPA must first give notice to the regulatee of his violation of the Act,
and then may obtain a compliance order or seek a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1)-(3)
(1976).
The Clean Water Act repeats the scheme of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. A refusal to permit an inspection is followed by notice to the violator and a
compliance order or a civil penalty. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1)-43) (Supp. 11 1978).
98. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act applies only to pesticides
and their production and distribution. A pesticide is defined by the Act as "(1) any
substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a
plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant. ... 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1976).
99. The Toxic Substances Control Act gives the EPA the authority to "regulate
chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment ... " 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1976).
100. The Safe Water Drinking Act applies to public water drinking systems. 42 U.S.C.
§300(g) (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
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themselves. The regulation of many of these products goes back as far as their
existence in our economy. The well-defined character of these three industries,
and the urgent federal interest in their regulation, all weigh in favor of their
inclusion within the pervasive regulation exception.
Although the nature of the industries regulated may satisfy the pervasive
regulation exception, the statutory inspection authority under the three acts
does not lead to that conclusion in all three cases. The Safe Water Drinking Act
is similar to the first four EPA statutes discussed in that it provides only for
civil penalties' 01 if an inspection is refused. An inspector under this statute has
no authority to make a forcible entry or to institute criminal proceedings if the
regulatee refuses to consent to a warrantless search. The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act specifically provides that warrants must be
obtained in order to enforce the inspection provisions of this act.'0 2 Therefore,
since warrantless, nonconsensual searches are not authorized under either
statute, the nature of the industries regulated becomes irrelevant and inspec-
tions under these acts are beyond the scope of the pervasive regulation
exception.103
On the other hand, the Toxic Substances Control Act provides for the choice
of either civil10 4 or criminal10 5 penalties for refusal to allow an inspection. The
inspection authority does not require a warrant before an inspection; 06 hence,
this statute is analogous to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The Toxic
Substances Control Act authorizes warrantless, nonconsensual inspections by
making it a potential crime to refuse. Since the industries regulated under this
act share the characteristics of pervasively regulated industries, and the
requisite statutory authority for inspections is present, the Toxic Substances
Control Act fits into the pervasive regulation exception.
10 7
In sum, the application of the pervasive regulation exception leads to a
different treatment for OSHA, the FDA, and the EPA. OSHA is not subject to
the exception, as confirmed in the Barlow's case, so that warrantless,
nonconsensual OSHA inspections are unconstitutional. The FDA is subject to
the exception, by virtue of its statutory authority and the characteristics of the
industries it regulates. EPA inspections cannot be treated uniformly, because
the agency administers seven different statutes. Of these, six do not meet the
requirements of the exception, while the Toxic Substances Control Act does.
Warrantless, nonconsensual inspections under the Toxic Substances Control Act
are therefore constitutional under this analysis.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 300j)-4(c) (1976).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 1368(b) (1976).
103. See text accompanying notes 70 to 74 supra.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2614(4) (1976) makes a refusal to permit an inspection a prohibited
act. Civil penalties are provided under 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1976).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1976).
106. Under 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (1976), EPA agents are given the authority to "inspect
any establishment, facility, or other premises in which chemical substances or mixtures
are manufactured, processed, stored, or held before or after their distribution in
commerce. . .. ." Inspectors are required only to present their credentials and provide
written notice at the time of the inspection. Id.
107. But see Martin supra note 90 at 135-37.
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Since the Barlow's decision, there have been no challenges in the federal
courts to warrantless FDA or EPA inspections. This perhaps indicates that the
regulatees of these agencies have accepted the approaches adopted by the
agencies themselves. It is important to note that the power to make a
warrantless, nonconsensual inspection is the extreme of an agency's inspection
authority. Most inspections never reach that extreme because a refusal to
permit a warrantless inspection will generally lead to an inspection warrant
rather than a forcible entry. Yet, the theoretical extent of any agency's power is
important because the validity of the entire inspection statute depends on its
conformance with Barlow's and its exceptions.
IV. CHALLENGES TO OSHA, FDA, AND EPA INSPECTION WARRANTS-
THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES
If a regulatee decides not to consent to a warrantless administrative search,
and the circumstances are such that none of the exceptions to the Barlow's rule
apply, the regulatee will very likely be faced with an administrative warrant. In
fact, the agency may choose to obtain a warrant before attempting the
inspection, thus leaving aside the entire issue of warrantless searches. A
growing body of case law has begun to define the issues and claims which are
available to those who decide to challenge the validity of an FDA, EPA, or
OSHA warrant.0 8 These challenges center on three major issues: the probable
cause needed to obtain the warrant, the scope of the warrant, and the authority
of the agency to obtain ex parte warrants.
A. Probable Cause
The Supreme Court's two-part standard of administrative probable cause as
expressed in Barlow's provides that the issuance of warrants may be based
either on "specific evidence of an existing violation,"10 9 or on a showing that
'treasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an .. .
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].' "110 The
interpretation of this probable cause standard has been the major issue in
challenges to administrative warrants.
The first part of the standard - specific evidence of an existing violation -
is usually satisfied in OSHA warrants through employee complaints.111 Several
cases have provided guidelines for making these complaints the basis of
inspection warrants. In In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert Manufacturing
Co.,112 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an OSHA warrant
108. See text accompanying notes 201 to 241 infra for a discussion of the procedures
available for challenging a warrant.
109. 436 U.S. at 320.
110. Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
111. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, employees or employee repre-
sentatives may request an inspection based upon a belief that a violation of safety or
health standards exists. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
112. 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S.
Ct. 174 (1979).
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application did not have to identify the employee making the complaint; nor did
it have to establish the credibility of the complainant.1 13 However, a mere
recitation that an employee complaint has been received has been found to be
inadequate to provide probable cause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall,"4 found that
an affidavit stating merely that "OSHA has determined that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . violations exist"' 1 5 did not provide the
magistrate with enough information concerning the nature of the alleged
violation to meet the Barlow's standard of probable cause. The court noted that
the issuance of a warrant based on such general language would essentially
strip the magistrate of any role in determining the presence of probable cause,
and thus negate the protection of the fourth amendment." 6
The EPA and the FDA are less likely to make employee complaints the
basis of their inspections, due in part to the fact that the persons sought to be
protected by these two agencies are not the employees of an industry, but rather
the ultimate consumers of a product" 7 or affected members of the general
public."' Nevertheless, both the EPA and the FDA can make inspections based
on complaints received," 9 thereby satisfying the probable cause standard of
specific evidence of an existing violation. For example, in Pieper v. United
States, 2 ° the EPA received information that an exterminating company was
violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and obtained
an administrative search warrant which led to the seizure of the company's
customer records. The district court refused to suppress the evidence obtained by
the EPA from this seizure, holding that specific evidence of the company's
violation of the EPA statute had provided adequate probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant.'
2 1
113. 589 F.2d at 1339. The court stated further that under the lower probable cause
standard espoused in Camara and Barlow's, the Secretary is not required to "set forth the
underlying circumstances demonstrating the basis for the conclusion reached by the
complainant, or that the underlying circumstances demonstrate a reason to believe that
the complainant is a credible person." Id.
114. 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 378 n.6.
116. Id. at 378.
117. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 100 & 101 supra.
119. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, a suspicion of a
violation of the Act is specifically mentioned as a reason for making an inspection. 7
U.S.C. § 1368(a) (1976).
Other statutes administered by the EPA provide in general terms that
inspections may be made for the purposes of enforcement. This language would certainly
include an inspection made pursuant to a valid complaint. See 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (1976);
33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-4(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978); id.
§4912(a) (1976); id. §6927(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); id. § 7414(a) (Supp. I 1978). The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act also speaks in general language which gives the FDA the
authority to inspect for any enforcement purposes. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1976).
120. 460 F. Supp. 94 (D. Minn. 1978).
121. Id. at 98.
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Although there have been no post-Barlow's challenges to FDA warrants
based on evidence of an existing violation, there is no reason to expect that
there will be any variation from the treatment given the EPA warrant in
Pieper. In general, therefore, the first part of the Barlow's test for administra-
tive probable cause can be satisfied by a warrant application which contains a
statement of the source of the complaint122 and a specific description of the
nature of the alleged violation.
1 23
The second part of the Barlow's standard of administrative probable cause
provides for warrants based on "a general administrative plan. . . derived from
neutral sources .. ."'" This standard has generally been used to justify the
issuance of warrants for routine inspections where the agency has no suspicion
of a violation. In one case, however, OSHA attempted to obtain a warrant by
conflating the two parts of the probable cause standard. In In re Establishment
Inspection of Northwest Airlines, Inc.,125 the agency did not attempt to
demonstrate specific evidence of an existing violation. Instead, OSHA asserted
that its statutory authority to make inspections pursuant to an employee
complaint126 constituted a reasonable legislative standard that satisfied the
second part of the Barlow's probable cause standard. 2 ' The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit refused to consider this argument, and chose to decide the
case by separating the agency's claim to a reasonable investigation program
from the claim involving the employee complaint. When viewed in this way, the
court found insufficient information as to the nature or existence of the
inspection program to permit the magistrate to perform his function, and thus
held that the warrant application was inadequate for lack of probable cause.
128
OSHA's argument in Northwest Airlines, that the authority to inspect based
on a complaint is itself a reasonable administrative standard, could perhaps be
the basis of similar claims by other administrative agencies that have statutory
authority to inspect pursuant to complaints. The main weakness in this
argument is that inspections based on complaints are not neutral. The Supreme
122. The actual identity of the complainant may remain anonymous. See In re
Establishment Inspection of Gilbert Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1979).
123. See, e.g., Burkart Randall, Inc. v. Marshall [1980] 48 U.S.L.W. 2823 (probable
cause established by warrant application which described unsafe conditions complained of
by two employees); In re Establishment Inspection of Fed. Die Casting Co., 484 F. Supp.
215 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (newspaper articles about employee accidents established sufficient
probable cause for warrant to issue).
124. 436 U.S. at 321.
125. 587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1980).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
127. 587 F.2d 12, 14 (7th Cir. 1980).
128. Id. at 14-15. The court stated that in deciding whether sufficient probable cause
exists for a warrant to issue under the second part of the Barlow's standard, the
magistrate must perform two functions. First, "(hie must determine that there is a
reasonable legislative or administrative inspection program and [second] . . . he must
determine that the desired inspection fits within that program." Id. In Northwest Airlines,
the Secretary's supporting affidavits were insufficient for the magistrate to rule on the
reasonableness of the inspection program, thus ending the matter at that point.
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Court in Barlow's explicitly defined an adequate administrative plan as one
"containing specific neutral criteria."'1 29 An agency's decision to inspect
pursuant to a complaint is not neutral because it singles out a particular
establishment for special treatment: the search for an alleged violation.
Therefore, an inspection based on a complaint is not within the Barlow's
definition of a general administrative plan.
Other courts have agreed with the reasoning in Northwest Airlines, and
have not attempted to combine the two parts of the Barlow's test for probable
cause. Instead, these courts have concentrated on the second part of the Barlow's
standard; i.e., the nature of the inspection plan described in the warrant
application. Under this part, the courts generally have required that the agency
describe its inspection plan in sufficient detail and show that the plan, when
neutrally applied, will lead to an inspection of the particular establishment
named in the warrant. The district court, in In re Establishment Inspection of
Urick Property,13 ° applied this test to an OSHA general inspection warrant and
found the statement of neutral criteria to be inadequate. According to the court,
OSHA's description of its inspection plan - which showed the administrative
adoption of a Foundry Emphasis Program, the selection of 300 foundries
nationwide for inspection, and the assignment of a general inspection to the
Erie area consisting of seventeen Pennsylvania counties - failed to give a
"recital of a rational basis for the selection of the Urick Foundry in the 17 county
areas in this region."'' The court suggested that this flaw could be corrected by
demonstrating that the choice of the local facility for inspection rested on
neutral criteria, such as selection by lot.132 Thus, the decision in Urick Property
indicates that an agency must specifically demonstrate the neutral application
of its inspection plan in the warrant application itself in order to gain the
approval of the reviewing magistrate.
This same principle was the basis of decison in Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser
Co.,133 in which the District Court of New Jersey dismissed an OSHA warrant
application for failure to show a reasonable administrative inspection standard.
OSHA offered three possible sources for the required probable cause. First, the
agency suggested that prior findings of plant violations required a reinspection,
but the court rejected this argument because the plant had already been
reinspected and no violations had been found.134 Second, OSHA claimed that the
passage of time since the last inspection gave the agency probable cause to
re-inspect. The court agreed that passage of time might be an acceptable neutral
criterion for inspection, but found that in this case the agency had given no
indication that it used the passage of time as its general standard for making
inspections. 1 35 Third, OSHA claimed that the plant had been selected for
129. 436 U.S. at 323.
130. 472 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
131. Id. at 1195.
132. Id.
133. 456 F. Supp. 474 (D. N.J. 1978).
134. Id. at 482-83.
135. Id. at 483.
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inspection pursuant to its "worst-first" inspection scheme which rated industries
according to the number of employee injuries occurring in a given type of work
in relation to the number of employees at a particular establishment. 136 Those
establishments with the highest injury ratings were scheduled to be inspected
first. The court recognized that such an administrative plan was adequate to
meet the second part of the Barlow's test,but the agency simply had not followed
its own plan in this case, nor had it supplied sufficient information to show that
the procedure was non-arbitrary. 137 Other establishments with higher ratings
had been passed over before selecting the Weyerhaeuser plant for inspection.
Thus, as in Urick Property, the determining factor in satisfying the Barlow's
second test for probable cause was found to be the neutral application of the
inspection plan, not merely the neutrality of the plan itself.
The court in Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co. implied that follow-up inspec-
tions, if conducted under appropriate circumstances, could satisfy the probable
cause requirement of reasonable administrative standards. This principle was
explicitly confirmed in Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. Marshall,138 where OSHA sought
an inspection warrant on the ground that the establishment had previously
been inspected and cited for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the probable cause
requirement was satisfied, because the business had moved to a new facility (the
one sought to be inspected) precisely in order to correct the OSHA violations
found in the first inspection.
139
If the inspections occur too frequently, however, the agency may leave itself
open to a charge of harassment. Harassment has been used as a defense against
administrative warrants on the theory that inspections conducted more
frequently at one establishment than at others suggest a discriminatory and,
therefore, a non-neutral application of an otherwise valid inspection plan. A
charge of harassment also implies that the motive behind the inspection is
something other than a mere search for violations. In United States v. Roux
Laboratories, Inc.,"a' the manufacturer of hair dye products refused to honor an
FDA inspection warrant, arguing harassment because the inspection was its
second in two years, and because the company was engaged in litigation with
the government in another state.14 1 The court found the claim unjustified since
the second warrant was issued in light of repeated refusals by the manufacturer
to allow entry and inspection."4 2 This result is predictable when one considers
136. See id. at 478-79 for a more detailed description of the "worst-first" plan.
137. Id. at 483-84.
138. 588 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1978).
139. Id. at 1188.
140. 456 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
141. Id. at 976.
142. Id. at 977. The argument that litigation W¢as in process in another state was also
dismissed on the reasoning that a pending case in California in no way affected Roux's
duty to submit to inspection of its facilities in Florida. Id. at 976.
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the FDA's mandatory duty to inspect and examine applicable industries,143 and
in view of the traditional judicial deference to an agency's discretion in carrying
out these duties.
44
Barlow's establishes that the courts must make distinctions in their
treatment of administrative warrantless searches based on the source of the
inspection; e.g., the FDA, the EPA, or OSHA. 145 However, these distinctions
disappear in the area of searches made pursuant to a warrant. Once these
agencies seek an inspection warrant, the standard of administrative probable
cause applies uniformly. The most successful challenges to administrative
warrants on probable cause grounds, as the preceding cases have shown, 146 have
centered on a lack of specificity in the warrant application. This lack of
specificity may manifest itself in a warrant based on either of the two parts of
administrative probable cause: specific evidence of a violation, or a general
administrative inspection plan. Other challenges have dealt with the nature or
application of a particular administrative inspection plan. The courts have been
willing to give these plans a detailed scrutiny, because a lesser examination
could erode the role of the judge as a neutral magistrate who is responsible for
the full enforcement of fourth amendment rights.
B. Scope of the Warrant
One of the major justifications for a warrant requirement in any govern-
ment inspection is that the warrant serves to limit the scope of the search, and
thus prevents abuse of the government's inspection power.147 It is not
surprising, therefore, that a major area of challenge to administrative inspec-
tion warrants has concerned the scope of the warrants.
Routine administrative inspections are necessarily broader than criminal
searches because administrative inspectors are not ordinarily looking for
particular violations. The Barlow's decision recognized this in its statement that
the Secretary of Labor's "entitlement to inspect will not depend on his
demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA
exist on the premises."' 48 In line with this approval of broad scope for routine
inspections, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in In re Establishment
Inspection of Gilbert Manufacturing Co.,' 49 upheld an OSHA inspection warrant
143. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a),(c),(d) (1976).
144. The explanation given for this judicial approval of administrative discretion is
that agencies need broad latitude in order to function efficiently. Constant judicial
interference with the day-to-day operation of the agencies would severely hamper their
ability to meet legislative goals. Harassment, therefore, is difficult to prove in the face of
this doctrine. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 55 (1965).
145. See text accompanying notes 44 to 106 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 111 to 129 supra.
147. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
148. Id. at 320.
149. 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S.
Ct. 174 (1979). The court's opinion in this case combined two separate appeals. The second
of these, Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., is the basis of the discussion here.
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which authorized an inspection of "the workplace or environment where work is
performed by employees of the employer and all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, materials, and all other things
therein (including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and
facilities) .. ."'o The court admitted that the scope of the warrant was broad.
Nevertheless, it found the warrant valid because no meaningful limits on the
scope could be devised while still fulfilling the purposes of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act."' Under this analysis, the court outlined its view of the
limits of the warrant: "[T]he scope of an OSHA inspection warrant must be as
broad as the subject matter regulated by the statute and restricted only by the
limitations imposed by Congress and the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.
15 2
This view, that the scope of an administrative inspection is coextensive with
the scope of the agency's statutory authority, has been generally accepted as the
standard for judging routine administrative inspection warrants. The FDA, for
example, has statutory authority to collect samples during its inspections of
manufacturing plants. 5 3 The hair dye manufacturer in United States v. Roux
Laboratories, Inc.15 4 contested the validity of an FDA warrant which provided
for the collection of raw materials samples. The manufacturer argued that the
agency should be required to state what tests it intended to run on the samples
collected. The court responded by affirming the FDA's statutory authority to
collect samples and by stating that under the statute, the manner and type of
the testing was a matter within FDA's discretion, and could not be the basis of a
regulatee challenge.155 The court, in essence, refused to make the scope of the
inspection warrant more narrow than the FDA's statutory authority.
In spite of this general judicial approval of broad administrative inspection
warrants, the courts have imposed some limitations. In Plum Creek Lumber Co.
v. Hutton,15 6 the District Court of Montana held that an inspection warrant
issued to OSHA did not give the agency the power to require fiberboard plant
employees to wear noise and fume sampling devices. 5 7 Although the court
found that the use of such sampling devices was reasonable under OSHA's
authority to inspect, it accepted the employer's argument that such devices
posed a possible safety hazard to the employees. The preservation of physical
safety is a reasonable limitation on authority to inspect and may, therefore,
be the potential basis for a successful challenge to the scope of a warrant.
150. Id. at 1343.
151. "Because the exact location of violations cannot be known prior to entering the
establishment, a narrow, restricted warrant would severely defeat the purposes of the
Act." Id.
152. Id. See also Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1969).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a),(c) (1976).
154. 456 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
155. Id. at 976.
156. 452 F. Supp. 575 (D. Mont. 1978).
157. Id. at 577.
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In Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 5 ' a federal district court in Louisiana
developed another limitation on the general broad scope of OSHA warrants.
OSHA officers sought to inspect offshore drilling rigs pursuant to an OSHA
administrative procedure which required the investigation of industrial accidents
that resulted in the death of an employee. Several employee deaths allegedly
had occurred at the facilities named in the warrants,'5 9 but the court found the
warrants to be too broad and in excess of OSHA's statutory authority. The court
observed that the language of the warrants basically repeated the language of
an OSHA regulation 1 60 that gave the agency the power to inspect all records
related to the purposes of an inspection. But a warrant that failed to specify
which records were to be inspected, the court decided, was overly broad. 16' The
source of this limitation is unclear. Although the Supreme Court in Barlow's
specifically rejected the warrantless inspection of documents by OSHA
officers,' 62 no explicit limitation was imposed on those inspections made
pursuant to a warrant. Yet, the court in Pool Offshore seems to have extended
the Barlow's limitation to include searches involving a warrant,16 3 thereby
rejecting the decisons in Roux and Gilbert which gave the agency as broad a
scope in its warrants as it had in its authority to inspect.'6 4
158. 467 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. La. 1979).
159. Two separate warrants for the same company were contested. The cases were
consolidated into one reported opinion. Id. at 979.
160. The regulation provides in part:
Compliance Safety and Health Officers of the Department of Labor are authorized to
enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed
by an employee of an employer; to inspect and investigate during regular working
hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner, any such place of employment, and all pertinent, conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment and materials therein; to question privately
any employer, owner, operator, agent or employee; and to review records required by
the Act and regulations published in this chapter, and other records which are
directly related to the purpose of the inspection.
29 C.F.R. § 1903.3(a) (1979).
161. 467 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. La. 1979).
162. 436 U.S. at 324 n.22.
163. 467 F. Supp. at 981-82.
164. The limitations placed upon the warrant in Pool Offshore can perhaps be traced to
the controversial place that business records have held in administrative searches. See 1
K. DAVIS, ADMINISITRTIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4:23-24 (2d ed., 1978). Many agency statutes,
including the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1976), require the
maintenance of certain business records. In the past, administrative regulatees have
argued that the use of these required business records in agency enforcement proceedings
which involve criminal penalties violated the privilege against self-incrimination. Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). Although the Shapiro Court rejected this argument,
searches of business records have remained an area of concern. The court in Pool Offshore
was perhaps recognizing that a search of business records may be a more significant
intrusion into the privacy of a business than a search of the business permises. In this
context, the requirement that the agency specify the records to be searched seems
reasonable.
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As a second ground for its decision, the court in Pool Offshore rejected the
warrants because they gave the OSHA inspectors the power to question any
employer found on the rigs.16 5 Finding this provision beyond OSHA's statutory
authority, the court restricted the scope of the questioning to those employers
specifically named in the warrant. This limitation also can be justified under
the Barlow's prohibition against warrantless OSHA inspections since a warrant-
less questioning of an OSHA regulatee arguably violates the fourth amendment
1VV1 I qLA VObIvuIrIII yrnJ xk IGL ,UV a Vax;Ai.WI WaIi4AuL.U iiwpLIU1.
Private employee interviews also have been held to be outside the scope of
an OSHA inspection unless the warrant provides for them. In Marshall v.
Wollaston Alloys, Inc.,'66 the United States District Court for Massachusetts
found that a warrant which merely repeated the broad statutory inspection
authority granted to OSHA l6 7 by permitting the compliance officers to enter and
inspect "all pertinent conditions, records, structures, machines, apparatus,
devices, equipment and materials therein,"' 6 did not give the inspectors the
authority to conduct private employee interviews.'69 Taken together, both
Wollaston Alloys and Pool Offshore indicate that the courts are unwilling to
accept "boilerplate" recitations of statutory authority when the agency is
capable of specifying the extent of its search. Pool Offshore and Wollaston Alloys
do not limit the authority to inspect of OSHA; they merely state that the full
extent of the agency's authority cannot be exercised unless it is specifically
described in a warrant.
The dearth of challenges to FDA and EPA warrants may indicate that, like
the absence of challenges to warrantless FDA and EPA inspections, 170 the
regulatees are satisfied with the conduct of these two agencies in their
inspections. On the other hand, it may indicate an uncertainty as to the
application of Barlow's to these agencies and an unwillingness to risk the loss of
goodwill between the inspectors and the regulatees, which often is a by-product
of litigation.171 Whatever the explanation, the cases dealing with the scope of
OSHA warrants show that there often may be valid grounds for challenging an
overly broad inspection warrant. There is no reason to believe that FDA and
EPA warrants are not equally vulnerable.
C. Ex Parte Warrants
In Barlow's, one of the major rationales for warrantless inspections offered
by OSHA was that administrative inspections are often best conducted with an
165. 467 F. Supp. at 982.
166. 479 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Mass. 1979).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
168. 479 F. Supp. at 1103 n.I.
169. Id. at 1104. See also In re Establishment Inspection of Fed. Die Casting Co., 487
F. Supp. 215 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (employee interviews upheld where warrant specificially
authorized private employee interviews by OSHA inspectors).
170. See text following h.170.
171. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 99.
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element of surprise. 7 ' According to the agency, the opportunity to inspect
without notice insures proper enforcement and prevents the regulatee from
hiding or correcting safety violations.173 The Supreme Court accepted this
rationale, but said that the element of surprise could be preserved within the
framework of a warrant requirement through the issuance of an ex parte
warrant. 
1 7 4
At the time of the Barlow's decision, OSHA did not have the regulatory
authority to issue ex parte warrants. If an OSHA officer was refused entry
during an attempted inspection, the regulation in force at the time of the
Barlow's decision required the refusal to be reported to the Regional Solicitor,
who was authorized to "take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if
necessary.' 175 The phrase "compulsory process" did not expressly include an ex
parte warrant, and therefore the Secretary of Labor amended the regulation
176
to explicitly define the term "complusory process" to include ex parte
warrants. 177 This amendment was effected as an interpretative rule, and no
public notice or comment accompanied it. Yet the Administrative Procedure
Act, 178 which governs the procedure by which agency regulations such as the
above OSHA regulation may be amended, generally requires that proposed
agency rulemaking be accompanied by public notice, public participation, and
172. 436 U.S. at 316.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 319-20. Several factors work together to support the Supreme Court's
reasoning on this point. First, the inspectors may obtain an ex parte warrant before an
inspection is attempted. Since the regulatee will have no advance notice of either the
warrant or the inspection, the surprise element will be fully preserved. Second, the
inspectors may attempt a warrantless search and be refused entry. An ex parte warrant
obtained after the refusal will still preserve much of the surprise element, because the
regulatee will not be given notice of the warrant and will not know exactly when, if ever,
the inspectors plan to return. Third, the vast majority of inspections, even if unannounced,
are carried out with the consent of the regulatee. See note 45 supra. Thus the surprise
factor is completely effective in most cases, even without resort to an ex parte warrant.
Finally, surprise is only one element necessary to an effective search. Administrative
inspections gain much of their effectiveness from thoroughness, persistence, and the
threat of penalties for violations. If the surprise factor had to be completely abandoned in
order to preserve fourth amendment rights, the Barlow's opinion suggests that the fourth
amendment would prevail.
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (1979).
176. Id. § 1903.4(d). The Supreme Court seemed to suggest just such a procedure in its
comment that "a regulation expressly providing that the Secretary could proceed ex parte
to seek a warrant or its equivalent would appear to be as much within the Secretary's
power as the regulation currently in force and calling for 'compulsory process.'" 436 U.S.
at 320 n.15.
177. The amended regulation provides: "For purposes of this section, the term
compulsory process shall mean the institution of any appropriate action, including ex
parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d) (1979).
178. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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delay in effective date. 179 Interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure or practice are grouped together as an
exception to the notice and comment requirements.
180
The Secretary of Labor's decision to amend the regulation without notice
and comment has created a controversy over the validity of OSHA's ex parte
warrants."' 1 The issue at first seems trivial, but it probably is equal in
importance to the other types of challenges to administrative warrants which
have been discussed. 8 2 If the amendment is found by the courts to be subject to
the notice and comment requirements, OSHA will be forced to comply with the
full Administrative Procedure Act provisions for rulemaking. This may involve
the agency in public hearings and controversy for a year or more, with no
guarantee of approval of the amendment. During the notice and comment
period, the agency will be left without ex parte warrant authority. Without such
authority, OSHA will be required to notify the regulatee each time a warrant
application is made. The employer can then appear at a district court hearing
before the warrant is issued and offer any protests he might have. Such
hearings may result in the magistrate's refusal to issue the warrant, but more
often they will produce a limitation on the scope of the warrant, which in itself
may restrict the agency's inspection program. In addition, the efficiency of
OSHA's program will be seriously disabled by such hearings because additional
time and manpower must be expended by the agency in court rather than in the
inspections. Needless to say, the surprise factor would be lost altogether.
The courts are sharply divided as to the validity of OSHA's ex parte
warrants. In Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall,"8 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the amended regulation was not an interpretative rule,
and thus notice and comment were required.1 8 4 According to the court, it did not
have to afford deference to the agency's interpretation of the regulation because
this was not a "'contemporaneous construction of a statute' by the agency
charged with its enforcement," but legislative rulemaking disguised as such.
1 8 5
In Marshall v. Huffines Steel Co.,18 6 the District Court for the Northern District
179. Id. § 553 (1976). See also Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA,
No. 78-2221 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1980); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
180. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976). The rule of thumb applied by most courts is that when
the proposed regulation substantially affects a substantive right of a regulatee under the
statute, notice and opportunity for comment are required. See Pickus v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
181. See, e.g., Stoddard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Marshall, [1980) 49 U.S.L.W. 2231;
Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Worksite Inspection of
S.D. Warren, 481 F. Supp. 491 (D. Me. 1979). But see, e.g., Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall,
620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Huffines Steel Co., 488 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
182. See text accompanying notes 108 to 171 supra.
183. 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
184. Id. at 982.
185. Id. at 979 (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
186. 488 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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of Texas expressed an identical view when it held that the new regulation
substantially affected a substantive right, thereby precluding interpretative
status.18 7 According to the court, "the procedure by which over five million
employers are kept in compliance with the Act ought not to be undertaken
without the opportunity for mature deliberation contemplated by the rulemak-
ing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act."'8 "
However, in Marshall v. W. & W. Steel,l1 9 the Tenth Circuit posited an
opposite view and held that the 1978 amendment to section 1903.4(d) was
indeed an interpretative rule because the amended regulation merely sought to
define the agency's use of the term "compulsory process" in light of the decision
in Barlow's.'90 Recently, the Ninth Circuit has agreed with the decision of the
court in W. & W. Steel, and affirmed the validity of the amended regulation
without notice and comment.' 91
The ultimate disposition of this issue is unclear. However, in view of the
recent two-to-one majority favoring the agency's interpretation of its rule, the
trend appears to be in favor of construing the amended regulation as
interpretative. This latter position is probably the correct one in light of the fact
that the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of ex parte warrants in its decision
in Barlow's,'92 as well as the fact that the original use of the term "compulsory
process" is sufficiently ambiguous to construe a later amendment as definitional
and, therefore, interpretative. But even if the circuits do not agree, OSHA may
still be able to obtain ex parte warrant authority through the notice and
comment procedure.' 93 Thus, while the Supreme Court will probably have the
187. Id. at 1000.
188. Id. at 1001.
189. 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 1325-26. Accord, In re Worksite Inspection of S.D. Warren, 481 F. Suppl.
491 (D. Me. 1979), where the court rejected the reasoning of the court in Cerro Metal
Prods., arguing that since the amended regulation was merely definitional, it did not
substantially affect a substantive right. Id. at 494.
191. Stoddard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Marshall, [1980] 49 U.S.L.W. 2231.
192. 436 U.S. at 319-20. It is interesting to note that much of the basis for the
reasoning by the court in Cerro Metal Prods. derives from an interpretation of Justice
White's dictum in Barlow's. Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 978-81 (3d Cir.
1980). Writing for the majority, Justice White had said that the kind of compulsory
process as stated in the regulation must include notice to the regulatee. However, Justice
White also said that the agency could amend its regulations to "expressly provide" for ex
parte warrants. 436 U.S. at 320 n.15. Significantly, the thrust of the agency's argument in
Barlow's was aimed at avoiding the fourth amendment warrant requirement altogether on
the ground that notice to the regulatee would hamper the administration of OSHA
procedures. Justice White responded with his dictum on ex parte warrants and his
statements should only be considered as such.
193. There is no guarantee, however, that the notice and comment procedure will
result in the successful promulgation of the regulation. In view of the strong sentiment
against OSHA regulation, see note 77 supra, it is very possible that the agency would be
unable to overcome public opposition to ex parte warrant authority. This was perhaps the
motivation behind OSHA's initial attempt to promulgate the rule without notice and
comment.
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final say on this question, for the immediate future, challenges to OSHA ex
parte warrants remain viable in the federal courts.
The same concerns and motives that prompted OSHA in its attempt to
obtain ex parte warrant authority are present in EPA and FDA inspections.
Both the EPA and FDA benefit from surprise inspections because the
unexpected visit often presents the truest indication of industry conditions. Both
agencies seek to utilize their manpower most efficiently by spending as little
time as possible in court. Yet, in spite of the attractiveness of ex parte warrant
authority, the Supreme Court's opinion in Barlow's seems to prevent any agency
from obtaining an ex parte warrant unless that authority is explicitly given by
statute or regulation. Since the Supreme Court, in dicta, said that OSHA's
regulation providing for "compulsory process" did not include ex parte
warrants,19 4 arguably other agencies would be unable to rely on general
inspection authority as a means of obtaining a valid ex parte warrant.'95 Of all
the statutes and regulations administered by the FDA and the EPA, only the
Noise Control Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
specifically provides for ex parte warrant authority. 196 Although there are
general provisions for judicial process in the remaining statutes,197 ex parte
warrants are not specifically mentioned. Since these remaining statutes are
identical to the statutory scheme discussed in Barlow's, there presumably would
be no reason for the courts to find a broader warrant authority for EPA and
FDA inspections than the Supreme Court found for OSHA.
If, however, the Barlow's decision is interpreted to provide for valid
warrantless searches under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Toxic
Substances Control Act,' 9 s it would be inconsistent to deny the agencies
authority to obtain ex parte warrants under these two acts. An ex parte warrant
provides more protection against unreasonable government searches than no
warrant at all. If the FDA and the EPA choose to obtain ex parte warrants,
199
194. 436 U.S. at 320 n.15.
195. But see note 192 supra.
196. The Noise Control Act specifically provides for ex parte warrant authority in a
regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 204.4(e)(2) (1979). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act provides for warrant authority in the inspection statute itself. 7 U.S.C.
§ 1368(b) (1976).
197. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that FDA officers or employees may
execute and serve search warrants. 21 U.S.C. § 3 72 (e)(2 ) (1976). The inspection provision
of the Act makes no mention of warrants, however, and it is not clear that the general
warrant authority mentioned in § 372(e)(2) was intended to apply to inspections.
The remaining statutes administered by the EPA provide only general inspection
authority. Warrants are not specifically mentioned. 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1318 (1976 & Supp. 111978); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); 42 U.S.C. § 6927
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978); id. at § 7414 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
198. See text accompanying notes 78 to 90 and 106 supra.
199. The circumstances which might cause the agencies to choose an ex parte warrant
over a warrantless search include situations in which the inspectors anticipate a refusal to
consent to the inspection or a court challenge to the inspection. In both instances the ex
parte warrant procedure may avoid a court challenge to the agency's warrantless search
authority.
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rather than to exercise their full power to make warrantless searches under the
two statutes, why should the Barlow's decision be interpreted to deny this
incremental protection of individual fourth amendment rights? The answer is a
matter of speculation because there have been no court decisions interpreting
this aspect of the Barlow's decision. One possible resolution of the inconsistency
is to view an agency's authority to obtain warrants as entirely separate from the
issue of warrantless searches. Under this view, warrantless search authority
may be governed by Barlow's and its exceptions, but the actual procedure for
obtaining a warrant is not affected by warrantless search power. An agency's
authority to obtain any type of warrant is then strictly controlled by its
statutory authority. Since the FDA and the EPA do not have explicit statutory
authority to obtain ex parte warrants in the two statutes at issue, they cannot
do so in spite of their varying powers to make warrantless searches.
The alternative to this line of reasoning, which is to allow ex parte
warrants in all cases where the agency has warrantless search authority, is less
satisfactory because it grants the agency an additional implied power that could
be provided easily by statute or regulation.2 °0 Clarification of this issue can
come either through a change in the FDA and EPA statutes, or through the
courts.
V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR CHALLENGING AN OSHA,
FDA, OR EPA INSPECTION
201
An informed court challenge to an OSHA, FDA, or EPA inspection will be
based not only on a knowledge of the issues involved, but on a knowledge of the
various routes available for presenting these issues. The procedures chosen can
affect the timing and expense of the litigation and, in some cases, the outcome.
The discussion which follows outlines the possible responses to each type of
inspection situation.
A. A Warrantless, Nonconsensual Inspection Occurs
If the regulatee refuses to consent to a warrantless administrative search
and is subjected to a forced entry and inspection, he can contest the search on
fourth amendment grounds in federal district court. The decision in Barlow's
clearly guarantees the success of such a challenge in the case of a warrantless
OSHA inspection. In addition, warrantless, nonconsensual searches under six of
the EPA statutes are precluded because of lack of statutory authority.202
A fourth amendment challenge to a warrantless, nonconsensual inspection
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 203 or the Toxic Substances Control
200. The Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to give the agency any implied power
in its treatment of the OSHA ex parte warrant regulations. 436 U.S. at 320 n.15. The
obvious reason for such reluctance is that it is difficult to limit implied agency powers once
granted.
201. See generally Rothstein, supra note 15, at 100-02.
202. See text accompanying notes 90 to 103 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 78 to 88 supra.
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Act 201 would presumably fail, because these two statutes seem to fit into the
pervasive regulation exception which was developed in Colonnade and Biswell,
and later recognized in Barlow's. There is no guarantee that the courts will
accept this analysis, however, since the Barlow's discussion, on this point is
vague enough to support either result. On a practical level, an opportunity to
challenge these two statutes is unlikely to occur given the large expenditure of
agency time and manpower which is required for challenges to warrantless
inspections as opposed to the other options open to FDA and EPA inspectors. As
long as there is a proven alternative available, i.e., warrants, there is little
chance that the FDA or the EPA will either attempt a forced entry or try to
employ their full theoretical inspection powers. 20 5
B. A Warrant Is Issued
If the inspectors arrive armed with a warrant, the regulatee may still refuse
to permit the inspection, and face the court challenges that will ensue. 20 6 Such
court action may be initiated by either the regulatee through a motion to quash,
204. See text accompanying notes 104 to 107 supra.
205. Although the element of surprise may be lost in a few cases as a result of the
issuance of the warrant, the agencies would probably be willing to bear this loss in order
to avoid a court challenge on the larger issue of warrantless searches.
Recent cases involving mine inspections may help to clarify the issue of agency
inspection powers in pervasively regulated industries. In Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry
Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the coal mining industry was pervasively regulated and that warrantless
inspections under the Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 were therefore
valid. The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari on this ruling. 100 S. Ct. 665
(1980).
The decision in Stoudt's Ferry is important because it is the first judicial addition,
since Colonnade and Biswell, to the list of industries which are within the pervasive
regulation exception. In addition, it strengthens the argument that the FDA and the EPA
can make warrantless inspections under proper statutory authority. The mining industry
shares many of the characteristics of the food, drug, and cosmetic industry, and the
chemical industry, in that it is well-defined but not limited to a single industry. The
regulatee who challenged the agency in Stoudt's Ferry was not engaged in coal mining.
The business, although regulated under the Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of
1977, involved the separation of low-grade fuel from sand and gravel. The Third Circuit's
ruling has thus extended the Colonnade-B iswell exception to include a more diverse type
of industry classification. It should be noted, however, that the court in Stoudt's Ferry
appears to have relied on the fact that the inspection provisions under the Mine Safety Act
are more limited and closely defined than the inspection provisions considered in Barlow's,
as well as an interpretation of the legislative history of the Act which indicates
congressional appproval of warrantless inspections. But more importantly, the scope of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act is similar to the
coverage of the Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1976 &
Supp. I 1979), and therefore, the decision in Stoudt's Ferry would appear to bolster the
argument for valid warrantless inspections under the FDA and EPA statutes. See also
Marshall v. Sink, 614 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Texoline Co., 612 F.2d 935 (5th
Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979).
206. In one specific situation, the regulatee can anticipate the agency's attempt to
obtain a warrant and prevent its issuance. If the inspectors arrive at the premises without
746 [VOL. 39
FDA, EPA, AND OSHA INSPECTIONS
or by the agency itself through an injunction proceeding or a contempt action.
Several cases have dealt with the issues that arise in these suits.
In Marshall v. Shellcast Corp.,20 7 the Secretary of Labor sought an
injunction in federal court to force compliance with an OSHA warrant. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district courts had no
jurisdiction to consider such a suit, and instructed the lower court to dismiss the
case. The court in Shellcast relied on its decision in an earlier case, Marshall v.
Gibson's Products, Inc.,20 8 in which the court had held that the district court had
no subject matter jurisdiction to hear an OSHA suit to compel an employer to
submit to a warrantless inspection. The court in Gibson's Products reasoned
that the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not expressly provide for such
jurisdiction, and therefore the courts could not infer its existence. 2°s However,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the Gibson's Products
decision in In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert Manufacturing Co.,210 when
the court refused to decide in favor of the company's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.2 ' Thus, the disagreement among the circuits
extends the possibility of OSHA suits to enjoin compliance with warrants.
A regulatee who refuses to honor an inspection warrant also leaves himself
open to the possibility of a contempt action. 212 This situation places the
regulatee in a particularly vulnerable position due to the difficulty of
anticipating the strength of his defenses in a later contempt proceeding at the
time of the anticipated inspection. The employer will, however, be allowed to
present these defenses. For example, in Marshall v. Huffines Steel Co.,213 the
Secretary of Labor initiated a contempt action when the employer refused to
honor an ex parte warrant. The district court held that the employer could
a warrant, and the regulatee refuses them entry, before the inspectors can go before a
magistrate and obtain a warrant the regulatee can seek an injunction in district court
enjoining the issuance of the warrant. See Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1980); Rothstein, supra note 15, at 100.
207. 592 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1979).
208. 584 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1978).
209. Id. at 675-78.
210. 589 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Marshall,
100 S. Ct. 174 (1979). See also text accompanying notes 149 to 152 supra.
211. 589 F.2d 1344. Without elaborating, the court stated that it was relying on the
reasoning of Judge Tuttle's dissent in Marshall v. Gibson's Prods., Inc. for its decision.
Judge Tuttle had argued that although Congress had not explicitly granted the federal
district courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Secretary of Labor's petition to
compel entry into an establishment, such jurisdiction could be derived from the
congressional intent behind the Occupational Safety and Health Act which sought to
create a right in the agency to conduct inspections. According to Judge Tuttle, "t hat
right would be nullified if the Secretary could not enforce it in the federal courts."
Marshall v. Gibson's Prods. Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 680 (5th Cir. 1978) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
212. See, e.g., In re Gilbert Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 174 (1979); In re Blocksom & Co., 582 F.2d 1122 (7th
Cir. 1978).
213. 488 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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challenge the validity of the ex parte warrant, even before the inspection,
because there was no showing by OSHA that any alternative forum (such as an
administrative hearing) existed for such pre-inspection complaints. In that
instance, the employer's challenge overrode the contempt arguments, and the
warrant was invalidated.
2 14
Another option open to the regulatee is a motion in district court to quash
the administrative warrant, either in response to the agency's court action or on
his own initiative. A motion to quash will be based on the same issues pertinent
to a hearing before Lhe issuance of a warrant: probable cause, the scope of the
warrant, harassment, or the validity of an ex parte warrant. A motion to quash
was involved in Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co.,215 where the employer
successfully challenged a court order requiring him to admit OSHA inspectors
by showing that the warrant was too broad.216 The strength of a regulatee's
claims must be carefully calculated in a motion to quash, because if the motion
is refused, the regulatee can be cited for contempt for his refusal to honor the
warrant. EPA and FDA warrants, as orders of the district courts, are subject to
the same court challenges as OSHA warrants.
217
C. The Warrant Is Honored, the Inspection Is Carried Out, and Some Type
of Later Court Challenge Is Sought
The regulatee who permits an inspection pursuant to a warrant may still
attempt to challenge the validity of the warrant or the results of the inspection
in federal court. However, a substantial obstacle to such a challenge, in the case
of OSHA inspections, is the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 2' 8 The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides that enforcement
214. Id. at 996-97.
215. 467 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. La. 1979).
216. Id. at 981.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Roux Labs., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
218. The issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies has, in general, received a
remarkably inconsistent treatment by the courts. This problem of inconsistent treatment
is apparent in all areas of administrative law; it is not confined to the context of OSHA
enforcement proceedings. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20.01
(1976). Three factors have occasionally been cited by the courts as helpful in balancingl
the regulatee's interests against the government's interest in requiring exhaustion:
(a) the agency's interest in having an opportunity to make a factual record and
exercise its discretion and expertise without the threat of litigious interruption; (b)
the agency's interest in discouraging frequent and deliberate flouting of the
administrative process; and (c) the agency's interest in correcting its own mistakes
and thereby obviating unnecessary judicial proceedings.
United States v. Newmann, 478 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1973). See also California v. FTC,
549 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
Perhaps some remnant of these concerns can be discerned in the judicial
treatment of OSHA exhaustion cases. See the discussion of these cases in text
accompanying notes 192 to 201 supra. However, in view of the largely discretionary
nature of judicial responses to exhaustion problems, see K. DAVIS supra, at § 20.01, it is
unlikely that any one approach to the OSHA enforcement situation will evolve.
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proceedings, including administrative hearings on contested citations, must
take place before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. 219
Exhaustion is not an issue when dealing with EPA and FDA warrants because
these agencies have no analogue to the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission.220 Thus, challenges to EPA and FDA enforcement orders are heard
directly in the federal courts. With regard to OSHA warrants, however there
has been a growing controversy over the elationship of the Review Com-
mission and the federal courts.22 1
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall,2 2 the employer submitted to an inspec-
tion warrant "under protest, 223 and was cited for a number of violations. While
discovery procedures prior to the administrative hearing were underway,
Weyerhaeuser filed suit in district court, claiming that the original inspection
warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause.224 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required in
this case because:
There is no benefit to be derived here from prior agency development of the
factual record as the court need only look to the face of the warrant
application to decide whether it met the requirements of administrative
probable cause. Nor is there any possibility of the agency decision mooting
the probable cause issue as the fourth amendment injury resulting from the
alleged illegal inspection will remain even if the citations are
dismissed. 225
The court then proceeded to invalidate the warrant for failure to meet the
admininstrative probable cause standard.226
219. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976).
220. See generally Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979).
221. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does provide for a regulatory hearing in the
case of a controversy over any order for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of any
regulation of the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1976). Factory inspections, compliance orders,
and legal enforcement proceedings are exempted from this procedure by regulation. 21
C.F.R. § 16.5(a)(3) (1979). Therefore, challenges to FDA enforcement orders are heard
directly in the district courts.
The statutes administered by the EPA expressly give the federal courts
jurisdiction over challenges to inspections. 7 U.S.C. § 1368(c) (1976); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2616(a)(1)(A) (1976); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 300j)-7(a)(2) (1976); 42
U.S.C. § 4910(c) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
222. 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 375.
224. See generally text accompanying notes 114 to 116 supra.
225. 592 F.2d at 376.
226. An earlier, related decision by the Seventh Circuit had reached a similar
conclusion. In Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1978), the employer
permitted a warrantless OSHA inspection and was cited for a number of safety violations.
The employer filed to contest these citations before the Review Commission. While these
proceedings were still pending, a second OSHA inspection was attempted pursuant to a
warrant. The employer refused to honor the warrant and became the subject of a civil
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a contrary view in Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Marshall.227 Citations for OSHA violations were issued as a result
of three warrant-authorized inspections. While proceedings before the Review
Commission were pending, the employer filed suit in district court to quash the
inspection warrants on the grounds that the warrants were obtained ex parte
and without probable cause. Thus, the facts were identical to those in
Weyerhaeuser, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that judicial
review could come only after administrative hearings were completed, even for
constitutional challenges. Relying in part on the decision of the First Circuit in
In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc.,221 the court explained its
decision by saying that the Review Commission would be able to develop a
factual record which would then be reviewable by the courts, and that judicial
self-restraint required that constitutional issues be deferred until other possible
grounds of decision had been fully litigated.2 29
The court also cited with approval a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Marshall v. Central Mine Equipment Co.,230 where the employer,
after submitting to a warrant-authorized inspection, had moved to quash the
warrant and suppress the evidence obtained under its authority. The magistrate
contempt action in the district court. Blocksom responded by filing a separate suit in the
district court that challenged both inspections. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that
Blocksom was required to exhaust its administrative remedies concerning the first
inspection because Blocksom's complaint dealt with factual and statutory defenses to an
enforcement action that were properly within the purview of the Review Commission.
Consistent with its opinion in Weyerhaeuser, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that the
complaint concerning the validity of the warrant in the second inspection could properly
be heard by the district court; without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at
1124.
227. 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
228. In In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Prods., Inc., 592 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1979),
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that an employer could only bring his
challenges to the warrant through the statutory enforcement procedure (i.e., first by
review before the Commission in an enforcement proceeding, and then only review by the
court of appeals). 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(a), 658(b), 659(a), 660(a) (1976). The regulatee in
Quality Prods. submitted to a warrant-authorized inspection which resulted in the
issuance of several citations. The employer moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of the warrant while administrative proceedings in which the employer was
contesting the citation were still pending. The Court of Appeals held that the federal
district courts had no jurisdiction to hear these challenges, "unless the movant clearly
demonstrates that his constitutional rights cannot be adequately adjudicated in the
pending or anticipated enforcement proceeding against him." 592 F.2d at 615. Thus, one
might possibly conclude that the First Circuit is in agreement with the decision of the
Third Circuit in Babcock which required exhaustion of administrative remedies. See
Rothstein, supra note 15, at 101-02. However, the court in Quality Prods. explicitly stated
that it was avoiding a definitive ruling on the jurisdiction of the federal courts since there
were other ways to challenge the warrant (e.g., an independent action by the employer)
which had not been considered by the court. 592 F.2d at 615 n.5.
229. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1137 (3d Cir. 1979). Accord,
Marshall v. Whittaker Corp., 610 F.2d 1141, 1148 (3d Cir. 1979).
230. 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979).
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who had originally issued the warrant granted the employer's motion,2 3'1 and
the district court affirmed. The court of appeals vacated the order of the district
court on the ground that the federal district courts were without jurisdiction to
hear an employer's motions to quash and suppress evidence obtained from an
OSHA inspection warrant.232 As in Babcock, the court relied on the decision of
the First Circuit in Quality Products, and reasoned that the employer was free
to raise his challenges to the warrant in the administrative enforcement
proceeding. Only after the administrative remedies were exhausted would the
employer be able to raise his constitutional defenses before the federal district
court.
The dichotomy between the Seventh Circuit on the one hand, and the Third,
Eighth and possibly First Circuits23 3 on the other, derives in part from differing
views about the role of the Review Commission. The Babcock decision
emphasized the value of the Review Commission's factual record and the
Commission's power to rule on the fourth amendment issues raised by a
contested warrant, as well as the general principles of administrative law which
prevent a federal court from impinging upon the Congressionally delegated
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. 234 The Seventh Circuit, in
Weyerhaeuser, pointed out that the Review Commission had never ruled on
probable cause issues in the past, and would therefore be unlikely to do so in the
future. 235 In addition, the court found little need for a post-inspection factual
record when deciding on the constitutional sufficiency of the warrant.236
It is difficult to predict the direction that other courts will take in dealing
with this problem. Part of the answer, perhaps, depends upon the performance
of the Review Commission itself. In this regard, it is significant to note that the
Commission has begun to consider constitutional challenges to inspection
warrants during enforcement proceedings. 237 If the Commission is able to deal
with challenges to inspection warrants in a timely and effective manner, there
will be less motivation for the federal courts to adopt the reasoning in
Weyerhaeuser, especially in light of the statement by the court in Babcock that
the issue is not whether an Article III court will hear the employer's fourth
amendment challenges, but when.238 However, in several instances the Review
231. Id. at 720. The magistrate then issued a more limited warrant.
232. Id. at 721-22.
233. See note 228 supra.
234. 610 F.2d at 1137-40.
235. 592 F.2d 373, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1979).
236. Id.
237. Before the decision in Barlow's, the Commission was reluctant to consider any
fourth amendment challenges to an inspection warrant since to do so would necessitate
deciding on the constitutionality of the section of the Act which allowed OSHA inspectors
to enter the premises of regulatees without a warrant. With the decision in Barlow's
mandating the use of administrative warrants, the Commission now has the jurisdiction to
pass on the constitutional validity of these warrants.. See Chromalloy Am. Corp., 1979
OCCUP. SAFETY AND HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 23,707. See also Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 n.37 (3d Cir. 1979).
238. 610 F.2d at 1138.
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Commission has been extremely slow and ineffective in resolving major disputes
between OSHA and its regulatees. 239 If this ineffectiveness continues, it could
lend support to an employer's argument that OSHA inspection warrants fall
into one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine on due process grounds.240
In sum, despite a growing position to the contrary, challenges to OSHA
warrants made after the inspection may be just as likely to succeed as those
made before the inspection is permitted. The issues concerning the validity of
the warrant remain the same. A major restriction to a post-inspection challenge,
however, is that the regulatee may be forced to pursue his administrative
remedies before reaching federal court. On the other hand, the employer is
assured of almost immediate federal district court review by refusing to honor
the warrant and presenting his fourth amendment defenses directly in the
contempt hearing. The major hardship of this procedure is that if the employer
loses the contempt case, he may be forced to spend time and money in Review
Commission proceedings before he is able to have his claims heard in federal
court again.
241
VI. CONCLUSION
The Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. decision potentially has broad implications
for the conduct of administrative inspections. However, any interpretation of the
decision is difficult because of the Supreme Court's vague definition of
administrative probable cause and its failure to announce a clear standard for
applying the Barlow's decision to agencies other than OSHA. These problems
are compounded for those businesses that must deal with several different
agencies at one time. A regulatee who considers challenging an agency's
inspection powers must first have a complete knowledge of the extent of the
agency's statutory authority.
An analysis of the statutory inspectional authority of OSHA, the FDA, and
the EPA, and of the nature of the industries regulated, leads to different
conclusions depending upon which statute is considered. Based on the holding in
239. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 102. One specific indication of dissatisfaction
with the Review Commission's performance is found in Marshall v. Berwick Forge Co.,
474 F. Supp. 104 (M.D. Pa. 1979), where the employer attempted to avoid the pursuit of
OSHA administrative remedies altogether. The employer had refused to honor an OSHA
warrant, was held in contempt by the district court, and eventually permitted the
inspection to take place. Berwick planned to appeal the district court's contempt ruling on
the ground that the warrant had been invalidly issued, and therefore filed a motion in
district court to enjoin any OSHA enforcement action while the appeal was pending. The
employer argued that pursuing administrative remedies at the same time that the appeal
was pending would be a costly and wasteful procedure. The District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania disagreed, saying that the interest of OSHA and the public in
seeing administrative procedures properly followed was greater than Berwick's interest in
saving money. Id. at 109. The court observed that this was especially true in Berwick's
case because the employer had not shown that his appeal was likely to succeed.
240. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1979).
241. See note 239 supra.
[VOL. 39
FDA, EPA, AND OSHA INSPECTIONS
Barlow's, it is clear that warrantless, nonconsensual inspections under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act are constitutionally invalid. This same
conclusion would apply to six of the applicable EPA statutes., However, FDA
inspections under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and EPA inspections under
the Toxic Substances Control Act are subject to the pervasive regulation
exception to the Barlow's principle, and thus are not violative of the fourth
amendment. With the exception of the OSHA statute, these conclusions have
yet to be tested in the federal courts, and in view of the diverse court treatment
of many other aspects of administrative inspections, there is no guarantee that
these theories will be accepted.
In spite of the potential differences regarding warrantless searches, OSHA,
FDA, and EPA inspections made pursuant to a warrant have received basically
uniform treatment by the courts since Barlow's. A successful challenge to an
inspection warrant from one of these three agencies again depends upon a
knowledge of the agency statutes and regulations. Assimilation of this
knowledge will lead to an informed choice as to which procedure to follow in
challenging the agency, and will help to define the issues (such as probable
cause, the scope of the warrant, harassment, and ex parte warrants) which will
be the basis of the challenge.
1980]
